This article presents new protocols for onion routing anonymity networks. We define a provably secure privacy-preserving key agreement scheme in an identity-based infrastructure setting, and use it to design new onion routing circuit constructions. These constructions, based on a user's selection, offer immediate or eventual forward secrecy at each node in a circuit and require significantly less computation and communication than the telescoping mechanism used by the Tor project. Further, the use of an identity-based infrastructure also leads to a reduction in the required amount of authenticated directory information. Therefore, our constructions provide practical ways to allow onion routing anonymity networks to scale gracefully.
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, a large number of anonymity networks have been proposed and some have been implemented. Common to many of them is onion routing · 29: 3
RELATED WORK
The concept of onion routing plays a key role in many efforts to provide anonymous communication [Dai 1998; Dingledine et al. 2004; Freedman and Morris 2002; Reed et al. 1998; Rennhard and Plattner 2002] while a number of other papers discuss formalizations and the security of onion routing [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2005; Mauw et al. 2004; Möller 2003; Syverson et al. 2000] . To date, the largest onion routing system is Tor, which has approximately 1000 onion routers and hundreds of thousands of users [Tor Project 2008] . These numbers (and their growth) underscore the demand for anonymity online.
In the original Onion Routing project [Goldschlag et al. 1996; Reed et al. 1998; Syverson et al. 2000 ] (which was superseded by Tor) circuit construction was done as follows. The user created an onion where each layer contained the symmetric key for one node and the location of the next node, all encrypted with the original node's public key. Each node decrypts a layer, keeps the symmetric key, and forwards the rest of the onion along to the next node. The main drawback of this approach is that it does not provide forward secrecy (as defined in Dingledine et al. [2004] ). Suppose a circuit is constructed from the user to the sequence of nodes A ⇔ B ⇔ C, and that A is malicious. If A records the traffic, and at an arbitrary time in the future compromises B (at which point he learns the next hop is C), and then compromises C, the complete route is known, and A learns who the user has communicated with. A possible fix for this problem is to frequently change the public keys of each node. This limits the amount of time A has to compromise B and C, but requires that the users of the system frequently contact the directory server to retrieve authentic keys.
Later systems constructed circuits incrementally and interactively (this process is sometimes called telescoping). The idea is to use the node's public key only to initiate a communication during which a temporary session key is established via the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Tor constructs circuits in this way, using the Tor Authentication Protocol (TAP). TAP is described and proven secure in Goldberg [2006] .
Trade-offs exist between the two methods of constructing circuits. Forward secrecy is the main advantage of telescoping, but telescoping also handles nodes that are not accepting connections; if the third node is down during the construction of a circuit, for example, the first two remain, and the user only needs to choose an alternate third. Information about the status and availability of nodes is therefore less important. The drawback of telescoping is cost; establishing a circuit of length requires O( 2 ) network communications, and O( 2 ) symmetric encryptions/decryptions. Øverlier and Syverson [2007] improve the efficiency of telescoping-based circuit construction using a half-certified Diffie-Hellman key exchange [Menezes et al. 1997, Section 12.6] . They further define an efficient single-pass circuit construction and a few variants. The proposed variants offer different levels of forward secrecy, which are traded off against computation and communication. For example, their eventual forward secret variants use frequent rotation of nodes' public keys, presenting the same issues as in first-generation onion routing; their immediate forward secrecy variant uses the same amount of communication as the current Tor (O( 2 )), but less computation. In related efforts, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2005] formally define the requirements of a secure onion routing construction in the Universal Composability (UC) framework [Canetti 2001 ] and present a generic construction of onion routing circuits. Although formally secure, their construction is less efficient than other constructions due to the additional mechanisms required to prove security in the UC framework. While no attacks are known when these mechanisms are removed, the proof no longer holds. Forward secrecy may be provided by using a forward secret CCA2-secure cryptosystem such as Canetti et al. [2007] .
The work of Okamoto and Okamoto [2005] presents schemes for anonymous authentication and key agreement. In Rahman et al. [2006] , an anonymous authentication protocol is presented as part of an anonymous communication system for mobile ad hoc networks. The protocols in both papers are complex, and limited motivation is given for design choices. Further, both papers neglect to discuss the security of their proposed protocols. The protocols we present in Section 3.2 are a great deal simpler than previous protocols. This allows them to be more easily understood, and simplifies the discussion of their security, which appears in Section 3.3. A recent article [Huang 2007 ] presents a pseudonym-based encryption scheme similar to our anonymous key agreement protocol in Section 3.2, but differs in its method of private-key extraction as well as in the motivation behind its use.
All these protocols owe a lot to the noninteractive key exchange protocol of Sakai et al. [2000] . In the next section, we will review their scheme after covering relevant background material.
PAIRING-BASED KEY AGREEMENT WITH USER ANONYMITY
In one of the pioneering works of pairing-based cryptography, Sakai et al. suggested an identity-based noninteractive key agreement scheme using bilinear pairings [Sakai et al. 2000] . In this section, we extend this key agreement scheme. We replace the identities of the participants by pseudonyms. The resulting scheme provides unconditional anonymity to participating users.
Preliminaries
We briefly review bilinear pairings and the original noninteractive key agreement scheme of Sakai et al. [2000] . For a detailed presentation of pairings and cryptographic applications thereof, see Blake et al. [2005] and references therein.
3.1.1 Bilinear Pairings. Consider two additive cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 and a multiplicative cyclic group G T , all of the same prime order n. A bilinear map e is a map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T with the following properties.
(1) Bilinearity. For all P ∈ G 1 , Q ∈ G 2 and a, b ∈ Z n , e(aP, b Q) = e (P, Q) ab .
(2) Nondegeneracy. The map does not send all pairs in G 1 × G 2 to unity in G T . (3) Computability. There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for any P ∈ G 1 and Q ∈ G 2 .
Our protocols, like many pairing-based cryptographic protocols, use a special form of bilinear map called a symmetric pairing where G 1 = G 2 . For such pairings e(P, Q) = e(Q, P) for any P, Q ∈ G 1 . The modified Weil pairing over elliptic curve groups [Verheul 2001 ] is an example of a symmetric bilinear pairing. In the rest of the article, all bilinear pairings are symmetric, and we denote G 1 = G 2 by G.
3.1.2
The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Using the preceding notation, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem is to compute e (P, P) ab c ∈ G T given a generator P of G and elements aP, b P, cP for a, b , c ∈ Z * n . An equivalent formulation of the problem is to compute e ( A , B) c given a generator P of G, and elements A, B, and cP in G.
An algorithm A has advantage (κ) in solving the BDH problem for n, G, G T , e , where κ is the bitlength of n,
c ] ≥ (κ). As usual, for the security parameter κ, a function η(·) is called negligible if for all c > 0 there exists a κ 0 such that η(κ) < 1/κ c for all κ > κ 0 . If for every polynomial-time (in κ) algorithm to solve the BDH problem on n, G, G T , e , the advantage (κ) is a negligible function, then n, G, G T , e is said to satisfy the BDH assumption.
Boneh-Franklin Setup and Noninteractive Key Agreement.
In a Boneh-Franklin Identity-Based Encryption (BF-IBE) setup [Boneh and Franklin 2001] , a trusted authority, called a Private Key Generator (PKG), generates private keys (d i ) for clients using the clients' well-known identities (ID i ) and a master secret s. A client with identity ID i receives the private key d i = sH(ID i ) ∈ G, where H : {0, 1} * → G * is a full-domain cryptographic hash function and G * denotes the set of all elements in G except the identity. Sakai et al. [2000] observed that, with such a setup, any two clients of the same PKG can compute a shared key using only the identity of the other participant and their own private keys. Only the two clients and the PKG can compute this key. For two clients with identities ID A and ID B , the shared key is given by
. Dupont and Enge [2006] proved that this protocol is secure in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem in n, G, G T , e is hard.
Anonymous Key Agreement
We observe that by replacing the identity hashes with pseudonyms generated by users, a key agreement protocol with unconditional anonymity is possible. In our protocol, each participant can confirm that the other participant is a client of the same PKG, but cannot determine his identity. Each client can, on her own, randomly generate many possible pseudonyms and the corresponding private keys.
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· A. Kate et al. Suppose Alice, with (identity, private key) pair (ID A , d A ), is seeking anonymity. She generates a random number r A ∈ Z * n and creates the pseudonym and corresponding private key (P A = r A Q A = r A H(ID A ), r A d A = sP A ). In a key agreement protocol, she sends the pseudonym P A instead of her actual identity to another participating client, who may or may not be anonymous. For two participants (say Alice and Bob) with pseudonyms P A and P B , the shared session key is given as
where r A and r B are random numbers generated respectively by Alice and Bob. If Bob does not wish to be anonymous, he can just use r B = 1 instead of a random value, resulting in P B = Q B . If persistent pseudonymity is desired instead of anonymity, the random values can easily be reused. Two participants can perform a session key agreement by exchanging pseudonyms. Further, two participants can also perform an authenticated key agreement by modifying any secure symmetric-key-based mutual authentication protocol and simply replacing their identities by their pseudonyms.
3.2.1 One-Way Anonymous Key Agreement. Anonymous communication often requires anonymity for just one of the participants; the other participant works as a nonanonymous service provider and the anonymous participant needs to confirm the service provider's identity. In the key agreement protocol, the service provider uses her actual identity rather than a pseudonym. Further, in this one-way anonymity setting two participants can agree on a session key in a noninteractive manner. A noninteractive scheme to achieve this is defined next.
Suppose Alice and Bob are clients of a PKG. As before, Alice has identity ID A and private key d A = sQ A = sH(ID A ). Alice wishes to remain anonymous to Bob, but she knows Bob's identity ID B .
( Note that in step 1, Alice can also include a message for Bob symmetrically encrypted with the session key; we will use this in Section 4. Note also that in practice, the session key is often derived from K A ,B , and is not just K A ,B itself.
Key Authentication and Confirmation.
In most one-way anonymous communication situations, it is also required to authenticate the nonanonymous service provider. With the noninteractive protocols of this section, the key is implicitly authenticated; Alice is assured that only Bob can compute the key. If Alice must be sure Bob has in fact computed the key, explicit key confirmation can be achieved by incorporating any symmetric-key-based challengeresponse protocol.
Security and Anonymity
In this section, we discuss the security and anonymity of our key agreement schemes in the random oracle model.
For the security parameter κ, we consider a problem to be infeasible, if for any polynomial-time (in κ) algorithm to solve it, the advantage (κ) is a negligible function. On the other hand, we consider a problem to be impossible, if for any algorithm to solve it with unbounded space and time complexity, the advantage (κ) is a negligible function.
Based on these definitions, we make the following claims.
Unconditional Anonymity. It is impossible for the other participant in a protocol run, the PKG, or any third party to learn the identity of an anonymous participant in a protocol run.
Session Key Secrecy. It is infeasible for anyone other than the two participants or the PKG to determine a session key generated during a protocol run.
No Impersonation. It is infeasible for a malicious client of the PKG to impersonate another (nonanonymous) client in a protocol run. In the case of persistent pseudonymity, it is not feasible for a malicious entity to communicate using a different entity's pseudonym.
Next, we prove each of our claims.
3.3.1 Unconditional Anonymity. Here, we prove that it is impossible for an adversary A to learn the identity of an anonymous participant in a protocol run. For ease of comprehension, we first briefly discuss it in an informal manner. For an anonymous client with identity ID A , the pseudonym P A = r A Q A ∈ G is the only parameter exchanged during the protocol that is derived from her identity. Because G is a cyclic group of prime order, Q A is a generator, so multiplying by the random r A blinds the underlying identity from the adversary A, which can be the other participant in the protocol run, the PKG for the system, or any third party. To formalize our proof, we consider the following game between an adversary and a challenger. 
Setup. The adversary

Guess.
A wins the game if she can guess the correct value of b with probability 1/2 + (κ) for a nonnegligible function .
As G is a cyclic prime order group, both Q A and Q B are generators of G. For the uniform random element r ∈ Z * n , the pseudonym P equal to rQ A or rQ B is also a uniform random element of G * . Therefore, an attacker cannot determine which of the two ways the challenger generated P and consequently cannot guess the value of b with probability greater than 1/2 to win this game. The inability of the attacker to win this game for system parameters of their choosing, even with unbounded computation power, proves our unconditional anonymity claim.
3.3.2 Session Key Secrecy. Dupont and Enge [2006] prove the security of the key agreement scheme of Sakai et al. [2000] in the random oracle model using an analysis technique by Coron [2000] . According to their proof, an attacker cannot compute the shared key if the BDH assumption holds on n, G, G T , e , and H is modeled by a random oracle. Here, we modify their proof to prove that it is infeasible for anyone other than the two participants or the PKG to determine a session key generated during a protocol run of the one-way or two-way anonymous key agreement.
Consider the following game to prove key secrecy in the one-way anonymous case.
Setup. The challenger generates groups G and G T of prime order n, a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} * → G * , a symmetric bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T , and a master secret s ∈ Z * n . Extraction Queries. PROOF. Let (P, aP, b P, cP) ∈ G be a random and uniformly distributed instance of the BDH problem, which algorithm B receives as input. To find the solution e (P, P) ab c , B simulates the challenger for A 1 or A 2 . This means that B must simulate the random oracle H and answer the private key extraction queries by A 1 or A 2 . As the steps for H-queries and extraction queries are the same in both A 1 or A 2 , we denote both of them by A.
H-queries.
At any time, A can query the random oracle H. To respond to these queries, B maintains an initially empty list L of quadruples (X , Q, h, β) ∈ {0, 1} * × G * × Z * n × {0, 1}. When A queries for the hash value of some bit-string X i , algorithm B responds as follows.
(
(2) Otherwise, B generates at random β i ∈ {0, 1}, so that Pr[β i = 0] = δ, where δ depends on B's choice for the attacker (A 1 or A 2 ) and will be determined shortly.
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Note that either way, Q i is uniformly random in G * and independent of A's current view. (4) Finally, algorithm B adds the quadruple (X i , Q i , h i , β i ) to the list L and responds with Q i .
Extraction queries.
A can ask for extraction queries for identity strings. For an input string ID i for private key extraction, B responds as follows.
(1) Algorithm B runs the aforesaid H-query algorithm for input
(3) Otherwise, B computes the private key h i (cP) = cQ i and sends it to algorithm A.
Challenge. After completing the extraction queries, B challenges A 1 with P A = aP or A 2 with P A = aP and P B = b P. Suppose that B does not report failure and outputs σ while using A 1 . As β B = 1, H(ID B ) = h B (b P) and with probability 1 , σ = e(aP, h B (b P)) P, P) ab c . Therefore B will guess correctly with probability 1 , when it does not abort. The probability that B does not abort while extracting a single private key query is δ; forueries, the probability is δ q . The probability that B does not abort while guessing the BDH solution is 1 − δ. Therefore, the overall probability of nonabortion is δ q (1 − δ). Maximizing this probability, the optimal value can be obtained at δ = q 1+q and by choosing the value of δ optimally, the overall probability of nonabortion is(1+q) q+1 . Therefore, B outputs the correct solution to the BDH instance with probability at least
The solution is computed in time t 1 + wq + t T + t inv , where t 1 is the time required by A, w is the time required to answer an extraction query (generate a random element r and compute the rth multiple of cP), q is an upper bound on the 1 If A 1 does not query the random oracle for H(ID B ), the probability it can guess this value is negligible. As there is a bijection between x and e(P A , x) for a given P A , the probability that A 1 can output K A,B = e(P A , H(ID B )) is also negligible. Thus, A 1 's advantage in this case is negligible.
number of such queries, and t T + t inv is the time to invert an element of Z * n and to compute an exponentiation of K A ,B ∈ G T in the guessing phase.
For adversary A 2 , we simply set the value of δ to 1. Suppose that B does not report failure and outputs σ while using A 2 . With probability 2 , σ = e (aP, b P) c = e(P, P) ab c , which is the correct solution to the BDH problem. The solution is computed in time t 2 + wq.
Note that it is possible to prove the security of the two-way anonymous key agreement protocol without random oracles, if we do not consider the query extraction phase. Assume that only one identity hash and private key pair (U, sU) is publicly available and each user uses the same pair to generate a pseudonym and corresponding private key. Given an adversary A to (t, )-
s when challenged by P A and P B , a random instance (P, aP, b P, cP) of the BDH problem can be solved in time t with probability by publishing (P, cP) as the publicly available identity hash and private key and challenging A with P A = aP and P B = b P.
No Impersonation.
We claim that it is infeasible for a malicious client of the PKG to impersonate another (nonanonymous) client in a protocol run. To successfully impersonate a nonanonymous participant ID N in our one-way anonymous key agreement protocol, given a pseudonym and ID N , an adversary needs to determine the corresponding session key. We observe that the adversary game for nonanonymous participant impersonation is the same as the key secrecy game of the one-way anonymous key agreement in Section 3.3.2 and consequently the corresponding theorem and proof carry over.
In the case of persistent pseudonymity, we claim that it is not feasible for a malicious entity to communicate using a different entity's pseudonym. Here, the malicious entity needs to find the shared secret key for a persistent pseudonym generated and used by some other anonymous entity and an arbitrary identity or pseudonym for which it does not know the private key. In the one-way anonymous communication protocol, the corresponding adversary game remains the same as that for impersonation of the nonanonymous entity, and in the two-way anonymous case, the game is the same as the one used to prove key secrecy. Consequently, the theorem and proof for the corresponding game are same as those used to prove key secrecy in Section 3.3.2.
Distributed PKG
The PKG in the BF-IBE framework, with the master key, has the power to decrypt all messages encrypted for clients. As our schemes use the same setup as BF-IBE, the PKG can compute a session key from the publicly available pseudonyms and the master key s. Due to this, compromise of the PKG is a single point of failure for security. Boneh and Franklin [2001] suggest the use of a distributed PKG instead a single PKG to mitigate this problem. Their distributed PKG uses t out of m Shamir secret sharing [Shamir 1979 ], which involves distributing the master key information among m PKGs, such that any t + 1 of them, but no fewer, can compute the master key or generate a private key for a client. Instead of this basic arrangement, we suggest use of a verifiable and proactively secure distributed PKG over the Internet [Kate and Goldberg 2007] , where a master key is generated in a completely distributed way with each of m PKGs contributing a random share. The distributed design is additionally more robust; at any given time only t + 1 of the m PKGs must be online in order for a client to retrieve his private key.
Applications of Our Anonymity Schemes
Our anonymous key agreement schemes can be used to perform anonymous communication in any setting having a BF-IBE setup. In recent years, numerous BF-IBE-based solutions have been suggested for various practical situations such as ad hoc networks [Chien and Lin 2006; Khalili et al. 2003; Seth and Keshav 2005] . Our anonymous key agreement schemes can be used in all of these setups without any extra effort. As an example, we refer readers to the secure anonymous communication scheme for delay-tolerant networks [Kate et al. 2007b] . In the present article, we focus on a new pairing-based onion routing protocol which achieves forward secrecy and constructs circuits without telescoping. We describe this protocol in the next section.
PAIRING-BASED ONION ROUTING
Low-latency onion routing requires one-way anonymous key agreement and forward secrecy. In this section, we describe a new pairing-based onion routing protocol using the noninteractive key agreement scheme defined in Section 3.2.
Our onion routing protocol has a significant advantage over the original onion routing protocol [Goldschlag et al. 1996 ] as well as the protocol used in Tor [Dingledine et al. 2004] ; it provides a practical way to achieve forward secrecy without building circuits by telescoping. Though this is possible with the original onion routing protocol, that method involves regularly communicating authenticated copies of onion routers' (ORs') public keys to the system users; forward secrecy is achieved by periodically rotating these keys. This does not scale well; every time the public keys are changed all users must contact a directory server to retrieve the new authenticated keys. However, our onion routing protocol uses ORs' identities, which users can obtain or derive without repeatedly contacting a central server, thus providing practical forward secrecy without telescoping.
Design Goals and Threat Model
As our protocol only differs from existing onion routing protocols in the circuit construction phase, our threat model is that of Tor. For example, adversaries have complete control over some part (but not all) of the network, as well as control over some of the nodes themselves.
We aim at frustrating attackers from linking multiple communications to or from a single user. Like Tor, we do not try to develop a system secure against a global observer, which can in theory follow end-to-end traffic. Further, it should · 29: 13 not be feasible for any node to determine the identity of any node in a circuit other than its two adjacent nodes. Finally, we require forward secrecy: after some amount of time, the session keys used to protect node identities and the contents of messages are irrecoverable, even if all participants in the network are subsequently compromised.
Pairing-Based Onion Routing Protocol
An onion routing protocol involves a service provider, a set of onion routers, and users. In our protocol, a user does not build the circuit incrementally via telescoping, but rather in a single pass. The user chooses ORs from the available pool and generates separate pseudonyms for communicating with each of them. The user computes the corresponding session keys and uses them to construct a message with nested layers of encryption. This process uses the protocol given in Section 3.2 times.
The service provider works as the PKG for the ORs and provides private keys for their identities.
Forward Secrecy.
There are two time-scale parameters in our protocol: the master key validity period (VP MK ) and the private key validity period (VP PK ). Both of these values relate to the forward secrecy of the system. The VP PK specifies how much exposure time a circuit has against compromises of the ORs that use it. That is, until the VP PK elapses, the ORs have enough information to collectively decrypt circuit construction onions sent during that VP PK . After each VP PK , ORs discard their current private keys and obtain new keys from the PKGs. This period can be short, perhaps on the order of an hour.
The VP MK specifies the circuit's exposure time against compromises of the (distributed) PKG which reveal the master secret s. Because changing s involves the participation of all of the ORs as well as the PKGs, we suggest the VP MK be somewhat longer than the VP PK , perhaps on the order of a day.
2 Remember that in the t of m distributed PKG, if at least m − t PKG members are honest and not compromised, no one will ever learn the value of a master secret.
Protocol Description.
As discussed before, we propose the use of a distributed PKG, but for simplicity, our discussion will consider the PKG to be a single entity. Using a distributed PKG affects only the setup and key generation steps.
Setup. Given the security requirements, the PKG generates a digital signature key pair (for any secure digital signature scheme). It also generates a prime n, two groups G (written additively) and G T (written multiplicatively) of order n and a bilinear map e : G × G → G T . Finally, the PKG chooses a full-domain cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} * → G * . The PKG publishes all of these values except its private signature key. Key Generation. During the key generation step, the PKG performs following steps.
(1) For each VP MK , the PKG generates a random master key s ∈ Z * n and a random U ∈ G, and calculates sU. The PKG publishes a signed copy of (v m , U, sU Note that this key distribution can be batched; that is, the PKG can precompute the master keys and private keys in advance (say a week at a time), and deliver them to the ORs in batches of any size from one VP PK at a time on up. This batching reduces the amount of time the PKG has to be online, and does not sacrifice forward secrecy. On the other hand, large batches will delay the time until a revocation becomes effective.
User Setup. Once during each VP MK , every user has to obtain the signed triple (v m , U, sU) from any OR or from a public Web site. Once during each VP PK , every user has to compute the following pairing for each OR i and store the results locally.
Circuit Construction. During a VP PK v, a user U chooses ORs (say OR 1 , OR 2 , . . . , OR ) and constructs a circuit U ⇔ OR 1 ⇔ OR 2 ⇔ · · · ⇔ OR with the following steps.
(1) For each OR i in the circuit, the user generates a random integer r i ∈ Z * n and computes the pseudonym P Ui = r i U and the value γ v,i
r i two session keys are derived: a forward session key K U,i and a backward session key K i,U . Finally, the following onion is built and sent to OR 1 , the first OR in the circuit.
Here {· · · } K U,i is symmetric-key encryption and ∅ is an empty message which informs OR that OR is the exit node. circuit. The OR then forwards the pseudonym and ciphertext to the next node. To avoid replay attacks, it also stores pseudonyms (see Section 7). The process ends when an OR (OR in this case) gets ∅. (3) The exit node OR sends a confirmation message encrypted with the backward session key {Confirm} K ,U to the previous OR in the circuit. Each OR encrypts the confirmation with its backward session key and sends it to the previous node, until the ciphertext reaches the user. The user decrypts the ciphertext layers to verify the confirmation. (4) If the user does not receive the confirmation in a specified time, she selects a different set of ORs and repeats the protocol.
The circuit construction is further illustrated in Figure 1 , where a user builds a three-node circuit.
Anonymous Communication. After the circuit is constructed, communication proceeds in the same manner as in Tor. The user sends onions through the circuit with each layer encrypted with the forward keys K U,i , and each hop decrypts one layer. Replies are encrypted at each hop with the backward key K i,U , and the user decrypts the received onion.
Note that as an optimization, one or more messages can be bundled inside the original circuit construction onion, in place of ∅.
We analyze the security for the preceding protocol in Section 6.
Advantages Over First-Generation Onion Routing
As discussed earlier, it is possible to achieve forward secrecy in first-generation onion routing by periodically replacing the public-private key pairs of the ORs. Following the change, the service provider publishes signed copies of the new OR public keys after getting authentic copies from the ORs. However, this requires all users to regularly obtain fresh authenticated public key information for all ORs.
In contrast, with our system, each user only needs to obtain the single authenticated value (v m , U, sU), and only once every VP MK . The user can then calculate the required γ v,i values on her own until the end of that period, thus reducing the load on the service provider. This load is further reduced by having the service provider never communicate directly with users at all, but only with the ORs.
As a consequence, our pairing-based onion routing is a more practical solution for low-latency anonymous communication.
Advantages Over Telescoping in Tor
The Tor network, in practice, uses the telescoping approach based on the DiffieHellman key exchange to form an anonymity circuit. We find the following advantages for our protocol over the telescoping approach.
-Although the protocol defined in Section 4.2.2 requires occasional private key generation for ORs to achieve forward secrecy, it saves communication cost at every circuit construction by avoiding telescoping. We discuss our communication and computational advantages in Section 8.5. -The absence of telescoping in our protocol provides flexibility to the user to modify a circuit on-the-fly. For example, suppose a user U has constructed a circuit (
In our protocol, she can bundle instructions to immediately replace OR i with OR i in the next message, while keeping the remaining circuit intact. Her circuit would then
Issues with the Proposed Scheme
The certifying authorities in the Tor system need to be less trusted than the PKG in our scheme. It is also possible for t + 1 malicious PKGs to passively listen to all of the traffic as they can compute private keys for all ORs. A geographically distributed implementation of m PKGs under politically diverse ownerships can certainly reduce this possibility. To passively decrypt an OR's messages, an adversary of the Tor system must know the OR's private key, as well as the current Diffie-Hellman key (established for each circuit). In our scheme, as it is noninteractive, an adversary who knows only the OR's private key can decrypt all of the messages for that OR. This may be an acceptable trade-off, considering the advantages gained from the noninteractive protocol.
Further, this onion routing circuit construction provides forward secrecy, only after ORs' private keys are rotated. In other words (as defined by Øverlier and Syverson [2007] ), it only provides eventual forward secrecy rather than immediate forward secrecy. Consequently, it has shorter VP PK as compared to the key replacement period in Tor and PKGs (any t + 1 of them) need to be online with greater reliability. If fewer than t + 1 PKGs are available, the whole system is paralysed after the current batch. In the next section, we resolve this issue, without a significant increase in circuit construction time, by introducing a partially interactive onion routing circuit construction. 
λ-PASS ONION ROUTING
Tor achieves immediate forward secrecy using telescoping. Telescoping can also be considered as an -pass circuit construction, where is the circuit length, with immediate forward secrecy at each of the OR nodes. In practice, however, it is sufficient to have immediate forward secrecy at fewer than nodes, as an adversary will be stymied when it encounters any such node. In this section, we define λ-pass onion routing circuit construction which achieves immediate forward secrecy at λ nodes (for 2 < λ ≤ ) with reduced circuit construction cost over telescoping.
Impossibility of Immediate Forward Secrecy in Single-Pass Circuit Construction
To motivate multiple-pass circuit construction, we will describe why it is impossible to obtain immediate forward secrecy in any single-pass circuit construction, regardless of the cryptographic setting.
In an immediately forward secret circuit construction, compromise of OR private keys after a circuit is built should not allow any information about the circuit path to be recovered. Further, after the circuit is destroyed and the keys are dropped, it should not be possible for any honest user and an OR to recompute their shared keys for that session. To achieve these properties, both parties must contribute some randomness to the creation of the the session key and they must drop these random values once the session keys are generated. Consequently, before the user can generate the forward session key, the random values (in some modified form) have to be exchanged between the user and the OR. The modified forms should enable only the authentic receiver to compute the session key. In an immediate forward secret circuit construction like Tor, these session-dependent random values are realized using the DiffieHellman exponents (x, y), while the Diffie-Hellman parameters (g x , g y ) provide the publicly exchanged forms of the randomness.
In any single-pass circuit construction, an OR does not reply immediately after receiving an onion (except for exit nodes). Therefore, addition of any randomness from the OR in the forward session key is not possible, before that session key can be used to convey the OR its successor. Consequently, any time later in the same VP PK , an adversary can compromise the OR, use the OR's private key to generate the session keys, and exploit those to find the next node in the circuit path. Further, although it is possible for nodes to send their part of randomness for session keys along with the (backward) confirmation onion, this does not provide any advantage as the adversary can always find the circuit path by decrypting the forward onion. Thus we see that it is not possible to obtain immediate forward secrecy in a single-pass circuit construction.
λ-pass Circuit Construction
As replies from the last node of single-pass circuit constructions are direct, immediate forward secrecy is easy to achieve at this node. Here, we consider λ − 1 additional single-pass circuit constructions to achieve immediate forward secrecy at λ nodes. We note that Øverlier and Syverson [2007, Protocol 3] propose a similar circuit construction, but their focus is on dealing with replay attacks. Our λ-pass protocol adds message flows to provide partial immediate forward secrecy, whereas their protocol uses an increased number of flows to prevent replay of construction onions.
5.2.1 Protocol Description. Although our λ-pass circuit construction can be applied in any public-key setting, for simplicity, here we present it for pairingbased onion routing, as defined in Section 4.
Setup, Key Generation, User Setup. These are as described in Section 4.2.2.
Circuit Construction. During a VP PK v, a user U chooses a set of ORs (say OR 1 , OR 2 , . . . , OR ) and constructs a circuit U ⇔ OR 1 ⇔ OR 2 ⇔ · · · ⇔ OR with the following steps.
(1) The user selects λ indices 1 < 2 < · · · < λ−1 < λ = .
(2) As in Section 4.2.2, for each OR i in the circuit, the user generates a random integer r i ∈ Z * n and computes the pseudonym P Ui = r i U and the value γ v,i 
Here {· · · } K U,i is symmetric-key encryption and ∅ is an empty message which informs OR 1 that it is the exit node. user decrypts the ciphertext layers to verify the confirmation and in the process, generates the modified session keys for OR 1 using the received pseudonym r U 1 Q v, 1 and the stored random value r 1 . After this, the user drops the random value r 1 . (7) Now, the partial circuit U ⇔ A · · · ⇔ OR 1 is used to extend the circuit to OR 2 by sending the following onion to OR 1 .
(8) The user completes λ passes to construct the complete circuit U ⇔ OR 1 ⇔ OR 2 ⇔ · · · ⇔ OR . (9) If the user does not receive any of the λ confirmations in specified times, she selects a different set of ORs and repeats the protocol. Figure 2 , where a user builds a four-node circuit with λ = 3.
Anonymous Communication. As described in Section 4.2.2. This circuit construction is further illustrated in
We observe that the security and anonymity properties of this protocol are straightforward extensions to those of our single-pass construction in Section 4; we elaborate on security in Section 6.
5.2.2
Value of λ and Node Placement. For λ = , the aforesaid circuit becomes a telescoping circuit construction. Øverlier and Syverson [2007] observe that, in Tor, there is always forward secrecy at the entry node, as the link between the user and the entry node in the circuit is encrypted using TLS. Therefore, our circuit construction defined in Section 4, without any significant modification, can easily be a 2-pass circuit construction having immediate forward secrecy at the entry node and the exit node.
Considering an adversary who controls some of the OR network (but not all, as in our threat model, Section 4.1), it is certainly advantageous to keep 2 < λ ≤ . We observe that for Tor, with a network of more than a thousand nodes, assuming a nonglobal and nonadaptive adversary, with access to an infrequently changing small part of the network, it is sufficient to have λ = 3; that is, immediate forward secrecy at the entry node, exit node, and one of the nodes in between. In this case, after the circuit is closed, the adversary's successive compromise of the ORs in a circuit is thwarted once it reaches the immediate forward secret node. In other words, assuming that the adversary has access to a few ORs in a circuit and can compromise all others in the network in the future, it still cannot link the two parts of the circuit divided at the immediate forward secret node.
However, for a stronger adversary, a larger value of λ is required. As an example, assume a similar network with 1000 nodes, of which 100 are compromised by a nonglobal but mobile adversary which adaptively modifies its set of compromised nodes at a very fast rate of one node per ten minutes. Similar to Tor, if users here change their onion routing circuits every ten minutes, then λ = 6 should be sufficient. With probability less than 0.01, even if the adversary owns two out of six immediate forward secret nodes and compromises one more while the circuit is still functioning, at least one immediate forward secret node other than the entry and the exit nodes will remain uncompromised until the circuit is closed and provide the necessary unlinkability.
An immediate question is the placement of the immediate forward secret nodes in the circuit path. It is easy to observe that a circuit with two adjacent immediate forward secret nodes is more difficult to attack using traffic analysis than one where those two nodes are separated. Further, as the ultimate goal of onion routing is anonymity for the sender and receiver, it is good to have immediate forward secret nodes at the start and at the end of the circuit. Therefore, we suggest λ/2 immediate forward secret nodes at the start of the circuit and remaining λ/2 immediate forward secret nodes at the end of the circuit. In cases when the recipient does not require anonymity (e.g., it is a Web server), the efficiency of the construction can be improved by placing the first λ−1 nodes closest to the sender; that is, by selecting i = i for 1 ≤ i ≤ λ − 1 and λ = . An attacker who observes the onion past the last forward secret node may be able to decrypt the remaining layers, but the first λ − 1 forward secret nodes have already provided anonymity for the sender.
Once the random parameters r U i and r i are dropped by the OR i and the user U respectively, deriving their session keys becomes the BDH problem, even if OR i gets compromised during the VP PK . Therefore, we achieve immediate forward secrecy at λ ORs and the VP PK could be longer, or made equal to the VP MK . The latter would also eliminate the need to attach validity periods to OR identities.
· 29: 21 6. SECURITY ANALYSIS Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2005] give a protocol for onion routing with provable security in the Universal Composability (UC) model Canetti [2001] . The UC model imposes additional overhead on their protocol. We aim for a simpler and more efficient protocol at the expense of provability in the UC model. Nevertheless, we prove some security properties of our protocol. Here is a list of the properties we consider; detailed definitions will follow.
-Cryptographic unlinkability. This property ensures that a circuit, which has at least one honest node, provides unlinkability between a sender and a receiver. This property allows us to use a strong attack model; anonymity is still possible when the adversary controls all but one of the routers in the path. By the term cryptographic unlinkability we exclude network-level linking attacks. -Integrity and correctness. These properties are defined by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2005] . An onion routing scheme has the correctness property if a message reaches the intended recipient whenever the an onion is (i) formed correctly, (ii) processed by the right routers in the right order, and (iii) these routers follow the protocol. Integrity is achieved if onions longer than some upper limit on the length can be recognized by routers. We observe that our circuit construction trivially achieves these correctness and integrity properties. -Key secrecy. An attacker controlling all but one honest node in a circuit should not be able to recover the secret key shared between the user and the honest node. Since this is effectively a run of the protocol in Section 3.2 between the user and the honest node, the security proof in Section 3.3.2 applies here as well. -Circuit position secrecy. Other works on the subject [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2005; Möller 2003 ] desire the following property, which we term circuit position secrecy. When a router receives an onion, it should not be possible for it to learn which position it has in a circuit (unless it is the entry or exit node). We discuss how to provide circuit position secrecy.
Note that when proving security using the previous properties, our λ-pass circuit construction in Section 5.2 can be considered equivalent to λ passes of our single-pass circuit construction protocol. Therefore, we do not consider it separately in our security discussion.
Cryptographic Unlinkability
Suppose an adversary controls all routers in a circuit of length except for one honest router, H. By collapsing the adversarial routers into a single entity, we can distill this scenario into
where nodes A 1 and A 2 are controlled by the adversary. When U sends an onion to A 1 , it is processed and forwarded to H who processes it and forwards it to A 2 . If A 2 can determine that the onion received from H was also processed by A 1 , then U and R can be linked. Traffic analysis and timing/correlation attacks may be able to link U and R, but in this section we show that there is no cryptographic linking possible.
When there are multiple users in the system (a basic assumption for all anonymity systems), the problem can be illustrated as follows.
We will show that this problem is equivalent to distinguishing ciphertexts. The situation depicted before is captured by the following security game, which we call the cryptographic unlinkability game.
Setup. The challenger C performs the setup described by the onion routing protocol.
It is assumed that router identities are of a fixed length to avoid attacks based on the ciphertext sizes. Create onions. The challenger chooses b ∈ {0, 1} at random.
If b = 0, C sends to A:
and if b = 1, C sends to A:
A 1 processing. Winning this cryptographic unlinkability game can be reduced to distinguishing ciphertexts. To prove this, we first present the IND-CPA game for (indistinguishability in a chosen plaintext attack).
Setup. Let E K be a symmetric encryption function which uses key K.
C chooses K at random from the keyspace associated with E. Extraction Queries An adversary A IND-CPA is given oracle access to E K . She can obtain ciphertexts for polynomially bounded number of plaintext messages of her choice any time during the game. A similar game, which we call the simultaneous-IND-CPA (s-IND-CPA) game, arises from the cryptographic unlinkability problem described earlier.
Setup. Let E K be an encryption function which uses key K. C chooses K 1 , K 2 at random from the keyspace associated with E. Extraction Queries. An adversary A s-IND-CPA is given oracle access to E K 1 and E K 2 . She obtains ciphertexts for a polynomially bounded number of plaintext messages of her choice any time during the game. We say an encryption function E is (s-)IND-CPA if for any adversary A which (t, )-wins the (s-)IND-CPA game, is negligible if t is polynomial. distinguish encryptions of E with key K 2 from randomly chosen strings with probability 1/2+μ, where μ = |γ −κ|. Since E is assumed to be a pseudorandom permutation, μ must be negligible, and κ ≥ γ − μ. Therefore, E is IND-CPA ⇒ E is s-IND-CPA. Therefore, if our encryption function is indistinguishable in a chosen plaintext attack, then our onion routing protocol has cryptographic unlinkability (in our model of multiple users and one honest router per circuit). Since key secrecy is proven for our construction, any symmetric key encryption which provides indistinguishability given key secrecy will give our protocol cryptographic unlinkability.
LEMMA 1. If E is a family of pseudorandom permutations, then E is IND-CPA if and only if it is s-IND-CPA.
PROOF. First assume an adversary
Circuit Position Secrecy (CPS)
We now treat the issue of preventing routers from learning their positions in a circuit. In our model, since users will typically not be routers in the system, routers may check if they are in the first position by determining whether the sender is a nonrouter. Similarly for the last router, since the destination will rarely be a router in the network.
Note that an adversary who controls all but one router in a circuit and who knows the circuit length is always able to deduce which position his routers have in some circuit. The best possible outcome with respect to CPS is that adversarial nodes "sandwiched" between two honest nodes learn nothing about their position.
The circuit construction protocol given (Sections 4.2.2 and 5.2) does not provide CPS, since the size of the onion changes after each step of processing. Using ideas from the construction of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2005] we may enhance our new circuit construction to provide CPS. We describe the changes to the protocol of Section 4.2.2 (this is the simplest case λ = 1). The symmetric key cipher used will be the pseudorandom permutation (PRP) E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} E → {0, 1} E , where 2 k is the size of the keyspace and 2 E is the size of the message space and ciphertext space. Recall that κ is a security parameter. The notation x ∈ R S means x is chosen uniformly at random from the set S.
We modify the construction of the onion from Eq. (1) as follows. Set
. . . . . .
We will denote the -tuple (y 1 , . . . , y ) by Y . The user now chooses π, a random permutation of {1, . . . , }, and sends the onion (r 1 U, (y π (1) , . . . , y π ( ) )) to OR 1 . The reason for including κ zeros at the beginning of each plaintext is to allow routers to distinguish plaintexts from nested ciphertexts and invalid decryptions. Since E is a PRP, if a ciphertext c is modified, the probability that E −1 (c) begins with κ zeros is 1/2 κ . All plaintexts must have the same length ( E bits), and are padded if necessary.
The processing step must also be changed. Upon receiving (r i U, Y ) from OR i−1 (or the user, when i = 1), OR i performs the following steps.
(1) Verify that r i U ∈ G. Use r i U to derive K U,i and K i,U (as before). On the return path, the only purpose the random group elements r i serve is to provide indistinguishability between the forward and backward portions of the construction. The anonymous communication step is unchanged.
We now prove CPS for the modified construction. (i−1) applied to them, to give two possibilities. If y j was honestly processed before reaching OR i−1 , A may remove layer i, but in all j = π(i) we can be sure that either this was randomized (in positions π(k) for k < i − 1) or that at least the (i + 1)-th layer of encryption remains (in positions π(k) for k > i). Since OR i+1 is honest, A does not have K U,(i+1) , hence these positions are indistinguishable from random to A (since E is IND-CPA secure). In the second case, y j was dishonestly processed before reaching OR i−1 and E
(y j ) arrives at OR i . Again, since E is a PRP which is IND-CPA secure, this is indistinguishable from a random value in {0, 1} E . Finally, since OR i+1 and OR i−1 are honest, they will not collude with A to help A learn i (for instance, by sharing any knowledge they have of i + 1, i − 1).
By similar arguments we may show that by observing the links between OR 1 ↔ OR 2 ↔ . . . ↔ OR it is impossible for a polynomial-time adversary to distinguish the forward part of the construction from the reverse part. To handle the case when λ > 1, the aforesaid construction may be used as is with |Y | = . During the anonymous communication step, the size of the onion is unchanged at each hop, and only the exit node learns anything from the contents.
SYSTEMS ISSUES
In this section, we describe how components of an onion routing system such as Tor would function in a pairing-based setting. To implement pairings, we must choose groups where pairings are known, and are efficiently computable. Once these groups are fixed we can estimate the computational cost required to construct a circuit. The next section will compare the costs of our schemes to the cost of setting up a circuit in Tor.
PKG. As discussed in Section 3.4, the PKG should be distributed across servers run by independent parties. To provide robustness, a "t of m" secret sharing scheme may be employed; this would mean that an OR need only contact t + 1 of m "pieces" of the PKG to learn its complete private key. Naturally, private key information must always be communicated over a secure channel. We note that end users of the system will have no reason to contact the PKG; the PKG only communicates with ORs, and sends one private key (an element of G) per VP PK to each. The load on the PKG should therefore be quite manageable. For added protection from attack, the PKG could even situate itself as a "hidden service" [Dingledine et al. 2004, Section 5] , so that only known ORs could even connect to it, and no one would know where many of the pieces were located.
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Channel Security. The security and forward secrecy depends on the channel between the PKG and the OR used to compute the private key. With a nondistributed PKG, an attacker can compromise an OR's private key by compromising this channel. The distributed PKG provides robustness here as well, since the attacker must subvert t + 1 secure channels to reconstruct the private key from the shares.
Onion Router Identities. Users calculate γ v,i based on each router's identity ID i . This identity can be as simple as a port number and a hostname or IP address. In that case, the BF-IBE setup ensures that if a user knows how to contact an OR, she automatically knows its public key.
The value γ v,i is also based on the current VP PK v. To avoid requiring tight synchronization between the clocks of ORs and users, ORs should keep their private keys d v,i around for a short time after the official end of the VP PK , but must securely discard them after that.
Replay Prevention. To avoid attacks where adversaries replay old circuit construction onions, ORs should store the pseudonyms they receive for the duration of a VP PK and drop onions which reuse a pseudonym. After circuit construction, replay attacks can be prevented with existing methods [Dingledine and Mathewson 2008] .
Directory Servers. Directory servers can be used to provide signed information about the list of available ORs to the users of the system. The directory servers in Tor, for example, provide a list of the ORs along with their public keys, status, capabilities, and policies. In our pairing-based setting, of course, the public keys are unnecessary.
PERFORMANCE
In this section, we consider the cost of single-pass and λ-pass circuit constructions from a user through onion routers. We estimate the computational cost, and count the number of AES-encrypted network communications. We compare the performance of our systems to that of Tor.
Security Levels and Parameter Sizes
Before comparing the costs of the cryptography in the schemes we determine the parameter sizes required to provide the same level of security currently provided by Tor.
Tor uses public key parameters to provide security at the 80-bit level [Goldberg 2006 ]. The discrete log problem is in a 1024-bit field, and the RSA problem uses a 1024-bit modulus. The symmetric parameters provide significantly more security, by using AES with a 128-bit key.
We must choose appropriate groups G and G T over which our pairing will be defined in order to offer similar strength. The current favourite choice is the group of torsion points of an elliptic curve group over a finite field, with either the Weil or Tate pairing. To achieve an 80-bit security level, the elliptic curve discrete log problem an attacker faces must be in a group of at least 160 bits. Due to the reduction of Menezes et al. [1991] , we must also ensure that discrete logs are intractable in the target group, G T . In our case, G T = F p k , where k is the embedding degree of our curve taken over F p . We must then choose our curve E, a prime p, and embedding degree k such that E(F p ) has a cyclic subgroup of prime order n ≈ 2 160 , and p k is around 2 1024 . This can be achieved in a variety of ways, but two common choices are k = 2, p ≈ 2 512 and k = 6, p ≈ 2 171 . Pairing implementations with both sets of parameters are available in the PBC library [Lynn 2008 ]. Efficiency studies suggest that k = 2 and the Tate pairing can offer better performance at this security level [Koblitz and Menezes 2005 ], so we make that choice.
Cost of Building a Circuit with Tor
Tor builds circuits by telescoping. A user Uriel chooses a Tor node (say Alice), and establishes a secure channel using an encrypted Diffie-Hellman exchange. She then picks a second node, Bob, and over this secure channel, establishes a new secure channel to Bob with another (end-to-end) encrypted Diffie-Hellman exchange. She proceeds in this manner until the circuit is of some desired length . For details, see the Tor specification [Dingledine and Mathewson 2008] . Note that Uriel cannot use the same Diffie-Hellman parameters with different nodes, lest those nodes be able to determine that the same user was communicating with each of them.
Each Diffie-Hellman exchange requires Uriel to perform two modular exponentiations with 1024-bit moduli and 320-bit exponents. Likewise, each server also performs two of these exponentiations. Uriel RSA-encrypts the DiffieHellman parameter she sends to the server, and the server decrypts it. The AES and hashing operations involved have negligible costs compared to these.
Uriel's circuit construction to Alice takes two messages: one from Uriel to Alice, and one from Alice to Uriel. When Uriel extends this circuit to Bob (via Alice), there are four additional messages: Uriel to Alice, Alice to Bob, Bob to Alice, and Alice to Uriel. Continuing in this way, we see that the total number of messages required for Tor to construct a circuit of length is ( +1). Note that each of these messages needs to be encrypted and decrypted at each hop.
Cost of Building a Circuit with Pairing-Based Onion Routing
In order to create a circuit of length with our single-pass circuit construction, the user Uriel must choose random elements r i of Z * n . As before, Uriel should not reuse these values. She then computes r S U and γ S r S , and derives the forward and backward keys K U,S and K S,U from γ S r S , for each server S in the circuit. Note that the γ S values were precomputed, and cost nothing during each circuit creation. Each server computes e(r S U, d S ) = γ S r S for its current private key d S and derives K U,S and K S,U .
Uriel creates one message, as in Figure 1 , and sends it to the first server in the chain. This server decrypts a layer and sends the result to the second server in the chain, and so on, for a total of hop-by-hop encrypted messages. At the end of the chain, the last server replies with a confirmation message The values in the Tor column are based on the Tor specification [Dingledine and Mathewson 2008] . PB-OR represents our pairing-based onion routing schemes. efs-OR indicates eventual forward secret ORs, while ifs-OR indicates immediate forward secret ones. avg represents the average of the indices of the λ immediate forward secret nodes.
that travels back through the chain, producing more messages, for a total of 2 .
Cost of Building a λ-Pass Pairing-Based Onion Routing Circuit
Our λ-pass pairing-based onion routing circuit construction is similar to that of our single-pass construction. Additional tasks that the immediate forward secret nodes must do are generation of a random integer r U i , computation of the pseudonym r U i Q v i , and computation of γ r i v i r U i . Uriel correspondingly has to perform λ pairing computations to generate modified session keys using the received pseudonyms r U i Q v i from λ immediate forward secret nodes. The number of messages and corresponding AES encryptions depends on the positions of the λ immediate forward secret nodes in the circuit. It is equal to 2 λ i=1 i = 2λ avg , where avg is the average of the indices of the immediate forward secret nodes in the circuit.
Comparison and Discussion
We summarize the results of the previous three sections in Table I . We count the number of "bignum" operations for each of the client and the servers, both for Tor and for our pairing-based onion routing protocols. We ignore the comparatively negligible computational costs of AES operations and hashing. For each bignum operation, we include a benchmark timing. These timings were gathered on a 3.0 GHz Pentium D desktop using the PBC pairing-based cryptography library (version 0.4.7) [Lynn 2008 ].
We can see that the total computation time to construct a circuit of length using our single-pass method is 61% less on the user side and 49% less on the OR side as compared to using Tor. In addition, this circuit construction uses only a linear number of AES-encrypted messages, while Tor uses a quadratic number. As compared to single-pass circuit construction, our λ-pass circuit construction requires an additional λ pairing computations by the user, requiring a total of 1.2 + 2.9λ ms, and on average 2.9 + 1.2λ/ ms for each of the ORs. For proposed values of λ = 3, 4, or 5, these are certainly reasonable times, considering the advantage of immediate forward secrecy, and having VP PK = VP MK .
CONCLUSION
We have presented new pairing-based approaches for circuit construction in onion routing anonymity networks. We first extended the protocol of Sakai et al. [2000] to allow for one-way or two-way anonymous or pseudonymous key agreement. We then used this extension to produce new circuit construction protocols.
Our single-pass circuit construction uses significantly less computation and communication than the corresponding protocol in Tor, and reduces the load on the network support infrastructure. To achieve immediate forward secrecy instead of eventual forward secrecy, we have also defined λ-pass circuit construction. These improvements can be used to improve the efficiency and to enhance the scalability of low-latency anonymity networks.
